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Abstract 
 
 Islamic banking is currently one of the fastest growing segments of the financial 
market industry, operating in over 75 countries through 300 institutions. While past 
literature has established the development of financial institutions as a determinant of 
economic growth, research on the correlation of the diffusion of Islamic banking with 
economic growth is limited. This study seeks to add to the literature by empirically 
analyzing the economic growth determinative power of Islamic banks. Confirming past 
research, Muslim prevalence in a population is found to be the most significant 
determinant of the diffusion of Islamic banks. Using this exogenous instrument in 2SLS 
regressions, results show that Islamic banks are not significantly correlated with 
economic growth. Most notably, including the Islamic banking instrument affects the 
strength of beta-convergence. Basic Solovian specifications show that convergence 
occurs; countries with higher initial GDP per capita grow more slowly. After accounting 
for the intensity of Islamic banking, this effect becomes much less statistically 
significant, suggesting that some of the effect of convergence may operate through the 
propensity to adopt Islamic banking. Empirical analysis disaffirms the hypothesis that 
Islamic banks minimize the explanatory power of legal origin on economic growth due to 
their independent implementation of Shariah law; the results show that accounting for 
Islamic banks has no effect on the determinative power of legal origin. Finally, the 
correlation of Islamic banking and financial deepening is largely dependent on legal 
origin, resulting in negative effects for countries with British legal origin and positive for 
those with French legal origin.  
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I. Introduction 
Islamic finance and the Shariah-compliant
1
 financial products that form the core 
of Islamic banking have become one of the fastest growing segments of the financial 
market industry, operating through more than 300 institutions in 75 countries (Cihak, 
Hesse 2008).
2
 Economists view financial and legal systems as two prominent 
mechanisms through which economic growth can either be supported or suppressed 
(Levine 1998). However, empirical evidence regarding the effect of Islamic banking 
transactions on economic growth has yet to be analyzed in detail largely due to data 
limitations. Certain components of Islamic banking such as risk-sharing, stability, and 
innovation are proven stimulants of growth while others, including limited liquidity, may 
be detrimental to the economy.
3
 Therefore, elements of Islamic banking likely impact 
economic growth, the net effect of which is undetermined and worthy of study.  
Legal origin has been established as a substantial determinant of financial and 
economic growth. However, Islamic banking is derived from a legal origin, Shariah Law, 
frequently separate from that of the institutions in the countries where it operates. While 
researchers have hypothesized that this phenomenon could change the effect of legal 
origin on development (Imam et. al 2010), to the best of my knowledge, no empirical 
research has tested this theory.  
The purpose of this study is to fill this gap in the literature. Specifically, this paper 
uses data from Bankscope and the World Bank to empirically test which factors (such as 
                                                          
1
 Shariah Law is the moral code and religious law of Islam, described as the infallible law of God. It deals 
with crime, politics, economics, and personal matters (Bashir 1999). 
2
 Figures 2, 3, and 4 show this diffusion.  
3
 Analysis based on a combination of hypotheses from the literature presented in the following literature 
review 
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legal origin, the prevalence of Islamic Banks, the savings rate, population growth rates, 
GDP per capita, financial inclusion, and other development indicators) contribute to a 
deepened Islamic banking system, the impact of an Islamic banking system on the effect 
of legal origin as a determinant of economic development, and changes in these effects 
over time (i.e., between 1960 and 2006). 
Regression analysis reveals that the share of population that is Muslim is the 
strongest determinant of the diffusion of Islamic banks. Results also show that while the 
diffusion of Islamic banks has no significant impact on economic growth, it decreases the 
GDP growth determinative power of the initial GDP per capita, suggesting that some of 
the effect of convergence may operate through the propensity to adopt Islamic banking. 
Empirical analysis disaffirms the hypothesis that Islamic banks minimize the explanatory 
power of legal origin on economic growth due to their independent implementation of 
Shariah law; the results show that accounting for Islamic banks has no effect on the 
determinative power of legal origin. Finally, the correlation of Islamic banking and 
financial deepening is largely dependent on legal origin, resulting in negative effects for 
countries with British legal origin and positive for those with French legal origin.  
This paper presents background information on the Islamic banking system and a 
review of the literature in Sections II and III, respectively. Section IV discusses the data 
employed and Section V presents the empirical strategy and results. Lastly, the 
conclusions and recommendations for further research are presented in the Section VI.   
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II. Background: Islamic Banking 
In order to examine the impact of Islamic banking it is important to understand 
the historical origins of the banking system in predominantly Muslim countries and the 
evolving divergences from conventional banks. The modern conventional banking system 
in Islamic countries is a product of colonizers using the support of financial institutions 
for mining, agriculture, and manufacturing. The initial banks were predominantly used 
for the funds of foreigners and as a means to increase foreign-owned industries that 
spread through imperial rule. While these institutions were used to finance the expansion 
of the public sector in the Middle East and North Africa, huge portions of the population 
made up of devout Muslims were left out of the banking system altogether due to 
voluntary self-exclusion caused predominantly by their religious beliefs (Mohielden et. al 
2011). A lack of the fulfillment of their banking needs has led to inefficient use of 
savings and a less powerful money multiplier, contributing to an overall liquidity 
problem.  
In recent years, Islamic banks attempted to fulfill this economic need by 
providing products that are compliant with Shariah law.
 
Such products are constructed 
around the philosophy that no person should profit from another’s loss, thereby 
prohibiting Riba (interest). The entitlement of the return from assets must lie in one 
bearing the risk involved in creating the return. In fact, Riba is sometimes considered to 
be a greater sin for Muslims than eating pork, drinking alcohol, or committing adultery 
(according to an Islamic holy text, Sunan ibn Majah). See Table 1 for a description of 
basic Islamic banking products and Figure 1 for a product comparison with conventional 
banks. 
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In conventional banking, depositors transfer risk to the bank by sharing their 
assets in order to obtain a stated rate of return, regardless of what the bank is able to earn 
on the assets. Borrowers who use conventional banks retain the risk themselves since 
they are required to pay back both principle and interest independent of the success of 
their project. Islamic banks differ in the treatment of both kinds of customers—depositors 
and borrowers. Investors share both the risk and return with Islamic banks. The return on 
an account is performance dependent, rather than guaranteed, and is often paid out 
through Hibah, an unguaranteed gift. Islamic finance emphasizes risk sharing through an 
asset-based model, contrasting conventional finance which is largely debt-based, 
facilitating the transfer of risk (Imam et. al 2010).  
Furthermore, Islamic banks share in the risk of Mudaraba and Musharakah 
(equity participation) contracts and credit default swaps are forbidden. Profit-sharing acts 
as an incomplete risk transfer in Islamic banks since the bank, theoretically, bears the 
entire burden of financial risk while the entrepreneur is solely responsible for the risk of 
wasted time and effort. Therefore, if a borrower’s project is unsuccessful, the bank alone 
takes the loss on profit; the borrower is no longer obligated to pay back the loan. The 
degree to which these returns are kept genuinely risky varies across individual Islamic 
banks; not all operate in a pure profit-sharing model and the allocation of profits to the 
individual versus the bank varies depending on the riskiness of the project and the norm 
established by competing local banks. However, holistically, this profit- and loss-sharing 
model increases the degree of risk for banks because Islamic banks acquire the direct 
credit risk normally borne by equity investors rather than holders of debt (Cihak, Hesse 
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2008). Consequently, Islamic banks have an increased incentive to be incredibly selective 
in their loan processes and strict in the monitoring of projects thereafter.  
Another key difference between Islamic banks and conventional banks is that 
Islamic institutions do not allow investment in toxic assets
4
, derivatives, conventional 
financial institution securities, or other similar instruments that adversely affected the 
conventional banks during the 2007-08 financial crisis (Hasan, Dridi 2010). These 
investments are considered to be inappropriate gambling and generating revenue by 
speculating on the movement of money, also forbidden in Shariah law. As a result of 
these divergent practices, Islamic banks have higher capital adequacy ratios, are less 
leveraged (have higher capital-to-assets ratios), have smaller investment portfolios, and 
rely less on wholesale deposits. 
  
III. Literature Review 
This paper examines these divergent characteristics through the lens of the 
existing literature regarding legal origins, financial development, and Islamic banking. 
These three categories of economic development research reveal the potential effect of 
Islamic banking on the communities and countries in which it has taken root. I discuss 
each of these components of the literature in turn, as well as the potential limitations of 
the literature.  
 
                                                          
4
 Hasan and Dridi (2010) define the term “toxic assets” as certain financial assets whose value has fallen 
significantly and for which there is no longer a functioning market, rendering the price unsatisfactory to the 
holder. This definition includes collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps, considered to be 
non-Shariah compliant. 
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III.1 Legal Origins and Economic Development 
Many economists argue that understanding financial and legal systems is 
imperative in order to understand economic development (Levine 1998). Both have a 
major impact on how people are able to respond to and take advantage of economic 
opportunities. The protection of property rights, access to liquidity, and capacity to save 
contribute to a positive economic environment that increases investment, capital 
accumulation, and productivity growth, well-known determinants of economic growth. 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003) examine the effects of two institutional 
mechanisms related to economic development: 1) the power of the state and 2) the 
adaptability of its legal system and financial institutions. The political channel facilitates 
contract law and the protection of property rights, namely the strength of legal protection 
in a country, which can facilitate productive economic transactions. The enforcement of 
contracts, for instance, may encourage more individuals to actually engage in business 
transactions since they can trust that the terms of the agreement will be upheld. The 
adaptability channel addresses economic evolution and responsiveness to socioeconomic 
conditions. For example, when the World Trade Organization (WTO) issues new 
regulations, a country’s ability to change its practices accordingly may be integral for it 
to be considered a viable trade partner and, consequently, for its economic success. Using 
cross-country regression analysis, Beck et. al (2003), find both channels to be significant 
in the development of the financial sector, revealing that both adaptability and legal 
strength are important factors in identifying pro-growth legal origins. Legal origin 
matters for financial development because certain systems are more likely to adapt 
efficiently to economic changes. The authors further find that the political mechanism of 
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Civil law is more protective of property rights and conducive to financial development, 
while Common law is inherently dynamic and, consequently, more adaptive.  
Studies have also shown that countries with strong legal systems have more 
developed banks in part due to the enforcement of contracts and the legally defensible 
priority given to creditors. Specifically, Levine (1998) finds that the legal environment, 
the exogenous component of banking development, is a positive determinant of per capita 
growth, physical capital accumulation, and productivity growth. While Levine 
acknowledges that his findings do not dismiss the possibility of causality in both 
directions, he argues that his data show that the legal environment affects the banking 
sector and this exogenous component is strongly linked with long-run economic growth. 
The legal origins and enforcement of contracts are subsequently associated with banking 
development that stimulates growth.  
 
III.2 Financial Development and Growth 
Beyond a country’s legal system, banking and financial institutions have also 
been connected with economic growth, albeit in a multitude of potentially contradictory 
ways. Three possible connections between financial development and economic growth 
exist: 1) financial development is a determinant of economic growth, 2) financial 
development follows economic growth, and 3) there is bidirectional causality between 
finance and growth (Furqani 2009). While it is difficult to isolate banking as an 
exogenous variable, attempts to do so have yielded results that show banking’s function 
as a transmitter of financial legal obligations does, in fact, have an impact on growth.  
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It has been argued that banks that are better at identifying creditworthy firms, 
leveraging savings, providing liquidity, facilitating transactions, and pooling risk 
accelerate economic growth (Bagehot 1873). Furthermore, according to Beck, Levine, 
and Loayza (2000), banks alter the allocation of savings to various firms through loans 
and influence growth by raising domestic savings rates and attracting foreign capital. 
Beck et. al test the differences in the level of banking sector development as a component 
of the relatively ambiguous “total factor productivity” and find a significantly positive 
impact of financial development on real per capita growth and productivity per capita 
growth. One conclusion they draw from their analysis is that financial development 
stimulates economic growth.  
There is also empirical evidence that the role of banking during the process of 
economic development evolves over time. Financial systems become more market-based 
as they deepen, with the growth of securities markets superseding that of the banking 
system. Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen, and Levine (2012) find that the association between 
economic activity and bank development decreases with economic development, while 
the association between economic activity and securities markets increases during 
growth. Specifically, their statistical analysis reveals that as log real GDP per capita 
increases, private credit rises as well, but the strength of their causal relationship declines. 
Therefore, while the level of bank development is still increasing, its effect on economic 
development decreases in terms of marginal returns, meaning it is a non-linear 
relationship. The empirical results show that the slope becomes negative after real GDP 
per capita reaches $1,032 in 2000 U.S. dollars (Demirguc-Kunt et. al 2012).  
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However, many economists question this causal assertion (Demirguc-Kunt, 
Feyen, Levine 2012). While financial development may contribute to economic growth, it 
is an endogenous variable, increased by economic growth itself. Therefore, it is difficult 
to determine the flow of causality. Demirguc-Kunt et. al argue that, while their model 
cannot specify a particular mechanism of causality, their results can refute stories of 
reverse causality. 
 
III.3 Applications of Islamic Banking to Growth 
As noted previously, the literature indicates that strong, adaptable legal origins 
and financial development contribute to economic growth. Islamic banking is based on an 
ancient legal structure and is quickly developing as a viable form for financial 
institutions. Therefore, using the findings of the literature regarding legal origins and 
financial institutions and applying it to the limited empirical analyses of Islamic banking, 
tentative hypotheses may be formed regarding the role of Islamic banking in economic 
growth.  
The literature reveals that the strength of the legal origins of a nation is an 
important determining factor of growth. However, this may not be the case with Islamic 
banking. While legal institutions are typically evaluated and assessed on a country-by-
country basis, the legal aspect of Islamic banking, Shariah law, operates across many 
borders. Imam, Patrick, Kpodar, and Kangni (2010 pg. 16) state: 
“Unlike studies that have found that institutions matter for financial development, 
we find that diffusion of Islamic banks appears impervious to the quality of the 
institutional environment. It may be that regardless of the institutional 
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environment, the way Islamic banks are permitted to behave is driven by 
relatively strict Shariah law, making the institutional environment less important 
than for conventional banks.” 
Shariah law is protective of property rights and contract law, providing a solid basis on 
which banks can form, regardless of a country’s underlying legal system. Islamic banks 
abide by both the law of the land and Islamic law, rendering a country’s law less 
powerful than in the case of conventional banks in determining their financial 
development. Although the strictness of Shariah law is apparent, its power may be diluted 
in practice, especially if a bank is merely repackaging products without following the 
letter of the law (Imam et. al 2010).  
 Many economists, starting with Bagehot (1873), argue that banks that excel at 
identifying creditworthy firms and pooling risk accelerate economic growth. The risk-
sharing model of Islamic banking in which risk cannot be transferred through financial 
markets may be more effective than the borrower-risk model dominating conventional 
banking. Since Islamic banks bear more of the burden of risk, theoretically I argue they 
should exercise more deliberation and prudence in their decisions to lend to firms; this 
effect could potentially lead to a more economically optimal distribution of liquidity. 
However, there is a lack of empirical evidence to support this claim.    
Although Islamic banks may not solve the problem of imperfect information 
between lenders and borrowers, their lending system incentivizes financing more 
successful projects. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) assert that conventional banks must ration 
credit as a result of the imperfect information in the lender-borrower relationship. Banks 
may attempt to transmit the potential risk of misinformation to borrowers through a 
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higher interest rate, but doing so results in an adverse selection effect; only borrowers 
pursuing riskier projects will take on higher interest because they have a low probability 
of actually paying it back (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Islamic banking rids borrowers of 
most financial risk, transferring risk to the lending institution. While this does not 
necessarily result in a better mechanism for information accrual, I argue this system 
theoretically incentivizes banks to exercise more prudence in their lending decisions. 
 Since Islamic banking links financial intermediaries’ returns directly to the actual 
revenue of the borrower, Siddiqi (1999) argues that funds are allocated towards projects 
that are more innovative and expected to produce better results. Siddiqi asserts that the 
risk-sharing aspect of Islamic finance incentivizes banks and private lenders to be more 
prudent with their funds and, consequently, allocate liquidity more optimally than 
conventional banks. Since lenders would have a personal stake in the success of the 
project, any risk they undertook would reflect a true belief in the success of the 
borrowers’ endeavors, unlike conventional lending in which risk can be bought and sold 
for profit primarily through credit default swaps. Siddiqi’s argument is questionable, 
however, since Islamic banks may also exercise more caution in their investments, 
stimulating less innovation than conventional banks due to the increased burden of risk. 
Furthermore, entrepreneurs have less incentive to work hard to achieve success since they 
are bearing such a limited financial risk. It is unclear which of these hypotheses 
dominates empirically.  
Absent of interest, some authors (see for example Siddiqi 1999, Hasan and Dridi 
2010) argue that this characteristic of Islamic banking should increase stability, thereby 
stimulating growth. Shariah-compliant products align entrepreneurs’ payment obligations 
12 
 
with revenue accrual, leading to a reduction of instability in financial markets. Islamic 
law prohibits the exchange of money for money or money for debt, which frequently 
degenerates into games of chance, creating instability through speculation (Siddiqi 1999). 
Siddiqi (1999) reasons that exchange rate fluctuations—indicative of volatile financial 
markets—are harmful to the growth of developing countries and, accordingly, the 
prohibition of interest can play an integral role in solving contemporary financial 
problems. Hasan and Dridi (2010) assert that stability became an apparent characteristic 
of Islamic banking during the recession, as Islamic banks experienced far less of an 
adverse economic impact than their conventional bank counterparts. However, it is 
important to note that they have also been less profitable in the recovery. 
While very little empirical evidence exists based on examinations of the Islamic 
financial system, studies that have been conducted diverge in their findings regarding the 
stability and superiority of Islamic banking over conventional banking (Furqani et. al 
2009). Using Islamic country data, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Merrouche (2010) find 
that Islamic banks are more efficient than conventional banks and have higher 
capitalization ratios. However, they are not more stable, as previously hypothesized, and 
they have similar business models and asset quality. They justify their findings with 
anecdotal evidence that reveals significant differences across countries in Sharia-
compliant banks. While some banks actually implement Sharia law, others merely re-
label conventional banking products as Islamic products. Although business orientation is 
fairly similar, Islamic banks have much lower operating costs and cost-income ratios than 
conventional banks (a 6.4 percentage point difference). It remains unclear as to why this 
would be true, and the literature diverges on comparative conclusions. For example, 
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based on z-score analysis, Cihak and Hesse (2008), find that large Islamic banks are less 
stable than large commercial banks, but small Islamic banks are more stable than small 
commercial banks. The authors assert that their findings are largely driven by the 
difference in the ratio of loans to assets and the cost-income ratio.  
The financial crisis that began in 2007 generated much attention regarding the 
potential superior stability of Islamic banks during the economic downturn. Hasan and 
Dridi (2010) show that although Islamic banks experienced more profitability than 
conventional banks from 2005-2007, as the crisis moved from the financial economy to 
the real economy, Islamic banks’ profitability decreased. Islamic banks experienced 
higher returns on assets and equity before 2008 but became less profitable than 
conventional banks post-2008. Despite this finding, Hasan and Dridi assert that their data 
show that Islamic banks were not drastically less profitable post-2008, contradicting the 
implication that more risk-sharing would lead to less profitability in a recession.   
In the long run, however, Bashir (1999) argues that Islamic banking stimulates 
innovation in the financial sector and amongst entrepreneurs, enhancing welfare. Since 
Islamic economics prohibits the use of certain mechanisms outlined in neoclassical and 
Keynesian economics (namely interest), Islamic central banks must find alternative 
means to manipulate the economy. The prohibition of fixed interest payments induces 
monetary authorities in Islamic economies to innovate alternative financial instruments 
without fixed nominal values or predetermined rates of interest. Bashir (1999) posits a 
model proving that financial innovation is welfare enhancing, while inflation reduces 
welfare and hampers growth.  
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Islamic banks may also stimulate growth simply through their existence. 
Countries with large Muslim populations that refuse to deposit their money in 
conventional banks would suffer from a low savings rate, limiting funds available for 
investment. Empirical studies show that the ratio of Muslims using financial services is 
much lower than their non-Muslim counterparts, although it is difficult to test the extent 
to which this impairs investment. However, the egalitarian objectives of Islam may 
remain largely unrealized because of lack of access to financial services for the poor in 
predominantly Muslim countries (Mohieldin et. al 2011). Consequently, an increase in 
participation in the banking system would increase the savings rate and access to 
liquidity, known factors of development. This effect may occur irrelevant of the bank’s 
actual practices. Bahar (1999 pg. 1) states: 
“The Islamic finance and investment industry can be a valuable ingredient in the 
development of more efficient and capable capital markets in the Muslim world 
and can hence contribute toward creating a more efficient world economy. Islamic 
banking can provide a financial intermediation system that allows the global 
community to access the savings of Muslims worldwide and vice versa.” 
The very presence of Islamic banks may increase liquidity on a worldwide scale. 
However, this assertion is based on the assumption that there are many Muslims who 
choose not to keep their money in a bank due to religious practices, of which there is 
neither conformational nor contradictory empirical evidence.  
Conversely, some researchers have found evidence that Islamic banking does not 
stimulate output and growth. Choudhury (1999) conducts an empirical analysis of the 
effect of Islamic banking on development and social well-being. He finds that for a 
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sample of Islamic banks (mainly based in Turkey, Dubai, Egypt, and Sudan), product and 
risk diversification remained low, inhibiting resources and dampening output. 
Consequently, he concludes that the development effect of Islamic capital markets and 
Islamic economic thought is ineffective. Choudhury attributes the absence of an empirical 
paradigmatic shift towards Islamic banking to the lack of strict Shariah-compliant 
institutions. A true implementation of Shariah law requires much more inter-sectoral and 
inter-institutional linkages than the data imply exist. Consequently, these empirical 
findings may reflect the impact of Islamic institutions as a theoretical presence, rather 
than the actual implementation of strict, Shariah law-complaint financial products.  
In addition to Choudhury’s assessment, the framework outlined by the literature 
on legal origins and financial development indicates some aspects of Islamic finance may 
inhibit economic growth. Although Shariah law provides a strong legal origin for Islamic 
banking, it is also known to be less flexible and adaptive than Common law or Civil law. 
As noted earlier, adaptability is one channel through which legal origins can contribute to 
economic growth. Implemented in practice, Shariah law may be more adaptable than it 
would seem from the strict text, however.  Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether 
Shariah law actually promotes or inhibits financial development. Furthermore, Islamic 
banks’ risk-sharing alleviates the borrower of any risk whatsoever and it is unclear as to 
whether this method is, in fact, a more optimal distribution of risk. Finally, Islamic banks 
may provide less liquidity than conventional banks since they must exercise more caution 
with their funds. Providing liquidity is an important aspect of the development 
contribution of banks. Whether Islamic banks distribute liquidity more optimally than 
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conventional banks or act to dampen liquidity through overly cautious lending is yet to be 
empirically demonstrated.  
While Islamic banks’ current contribution to growth is unclear, the literature 
argues that there is a large potential for Shariah financial products to play a role in growth 
in the future. Infrastructure development is known to influence economic development. 
Al Rajhi (1999) argues that there are many opportunities for Islamic banks to finance 
development projects in both the private and public sector in cooperation with global 
economic organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, IFC, and the Islamic Development 
Bank. Furthermore, Obaidullah (1999) asserts that the success of infrastructure programs 
depends largely on an optimal sharing of risks and rewards, a characteristic inherent to 
Islamic banking that could be leveraged.  
 
III. 4 Potential Issues in the Literature 
A common concern expressed by some researchers (see for example, Choudhury 
1999) is the inconsistency of the actual applications of Islamic financial products. Across 
institutions, there exists a wide range of products with varying degrees of Shariah 
compliancy. In fact, anecdotal evidence exists of conventional banks simply labeling 
products as Shariah compliant without changing their conventional, interest-bearing 
characteristics. There are also discrepancies as to what is actually permitted under 
Shariah law. Therefore, it is difficult to measure the true effect of their financial 
intermediation.  
Furthermore, an inherent endogeneity problem exists in the analysis of Islamic 
financial institutions. Imam et. al (2010) find that the greatest determinant of the 
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diffusion of Islamic banks is income per capita, followed by the share of Muslims in the 
population. Diffusion has been concentrated in high-Muslim population and high-growth 
areas, as shown in Figures 2, 3, and 4
5
. Accordingly, countries with Islamic banks present 
may already be experiencing relatively high growth rates due to natural Solovian 
convergence, resulting in higher per capita income. While Levine (1998) attempts to 
address this problem by using legal origin as the exogenous component of banking 
development, it is not entirely clear that this would solve the problem of endogeneity for 
testing the deepening of Islamic financial systems since they are based on a legal 
framework separate from countries’ legal origins. Furthermore, Imam et. al. show that 
financial development, represented by legal origin, is not statistically significantly 
correlated with a higher share of Islamic bank assets. Financial intermediation neither 
hampers nor stimulates the growth of Islamic banking  
 Ultimately, Islamic banking has many characteristics that may benefit economic 
growth, but little empirical evidence exists. Strong legal origins and a risk-sharing 
framework may create a more responsible lending system, resulting in a more stable 
financial environment. However, limited access to liquidity and no risk on the part of 
borrowers may have negative effects on growth. This paper attempts to fill these gaps in 
the literature by testing these hypotheses through an empirical analysis of factors that 
affect the diffusion of Islamic banks and the concurrent effect of Islamic banking on the 
deepening of the financial system and, more broadly, economic growth. 
 
                                                          
5
 These maps were created using Bankscope data.  
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IV. Data 
The data used for the analysis for all banking variables is from Bankscope, a part 
of Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Development indicator variables are 
compiled from Governance Matters and the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
Database, both a part of the World Bank. Variables on legal origin are from the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). These data sources provide a robust set of 
consistent variables that are commonly used in the literature to analyze economic and 
political growth. While the data covers between 190 and 211 countries from 1960 to 
2006, resulting in roughly 9000 country-year observations, of these only 345 specifically 
specify the number of Islamic banks present.
6
 Consequently, I construct  two sets of data: 
data with 345 observations ranging from zero to sixteen Islamic banks and a dataset with 
the full 9000 observations, where I have replaced missing information on Islamic banks 
with a value of zero based on the inference that countries with missing data were, in fact, 
absent of Islamic banks. This assumption is based on qualitative research and checked for 
robustness in the empirical analysis presented below.
7
 Such categorical distinctions are 
important since they allow for both narrow comparisons of countries that deepened their 
Islamic banking systems over time and a more robust comparison to countries that never 
procured Islamic banks in the tested time period. 
The data includes legal origins that are based on the original country that 
influenced the legal system, most frequently in the early twentieth century. These legal 
origins include English, French, Socialist, German, and Scandanavian, each of which 
have defining attributes that may have an effect on contemporary institutions. La-Porta, 
                                                          
6
 All variable descriptions are included in Table 3.  
7
 A complete list of countries with missing data replaced with “0” Islamic banks is included in Table 2.  
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Lopez-di-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) introduced these data and provide further 
discussion in their paper. The data also includes a Socialist binary variable, applied solely 
to countries that have not reverted to their pre-communist legal systems, and first applied 
by Djankov, Simeon, Caralee McLiesh, and Andrei Shleifer (2005).  Table 4 shows that 
the plurality of countries in the dataset have French legal origins, followed closely by 
those with British Common law tradition.  
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are also included in the data, 
comprised of six indicators of broad dimensions of governance described in Table 5: 
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Voiolence, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. These 
variables are scores assigned by survey respondents, non-governmental organizations, 
private firms, and public sector organizations worldwide. The indicators range in value 
from -2.5 to 2.5 in the standard normal units of the governance indicator, meaning that a 
score of 1 represents 1 standard deviation above the mean. A higher score is indicative of 
a more positive assessment of government (Kauffman 2010). 
Table 6 presents noteworthy patterns of WGI summary statistics by the presences 
of Islamic Banks. Countries that have Islamic banks receive significantly higher scores in 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of corruption. Their scores 
increase in value over time, meaning their governance indicators are becoming more 
positive, indicative of institutional growth. The all-inclusive category’s results show that 
there is a large divergence in voice and accountability and political stability in countries 
with Islamic banks in comparison to countries without them, most of whom never 
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procured Islamic banks over the entire time series. Countries with Islamic banks have 
lower mean scores in all categories, indicative of the political demography of the 
countries in regions where Islamic banking tends to grow, namely the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia.   
To explore the relationship between the growth of Islamic banking and economic 
growth, a range of growth indicators are included. Gross domestic product, the 
investment share of GDP, and the population growth rate are the traditional growth 
indicators. Various forms of domestic interest rates are included along with the percent 
Muslim share of the population.  
The relevant banking variables include the real interest rate, the deposit interest 
rate, the lending interest rate, and the assets and loans of both Islamic banks and 
conventional banks. Furthermore, the number of each type of institution present in the 
country and relevant financial metrics (i.e. return on assets) are included. Two additional 
variables are created as a ratio of the assets of Islamic banks to conventional banks and 
the return on assets of Islamic banks to the return on assets of conventional banks. 
Finally, a variable is included that indicates financial depth, the ratio of total assets in 
banks to GDP. This variable is frequently used in the literature to represent the relative 
growth of the banking sector in cross-country comparisons. 
Table 7 reveals that countries with Islamic banks have statistically significant 
divergences in physical capital savings rate, deposit interest rate, lending interest rate, 
and GDP per capita. This highlights the correlation of an increase of financial attributes 
with Islamic banking sectors. The savings rate is approximately seven percentage points 
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higher and GDP is five times greater in countries where Islamic banks are present. 
However, the differences in financial depth by the presence of Islamic banks are not 
statistically significant. This finding is surprising since it indicates that Islamic banks are 
not contributing significantly to financial depth in countries where they diffuse. However, 
when countries that never had Islamic banking during the time series are included in the 
comparison, population growth and financial depth become statistically significant. This 
shows that Islamic banks are generally taking root in countries that are relatively 
financially developed. On average, countries with Islamic banks have a much higher 
population growth rate, more Muslim share of the population, a deeper financial system, 
and greater GDP per capita than countries without Islamic banks. This confirms 
expectations that are in accordance with the demographic of the countries in which 
Islamic banks diffuse. 
 Table 8 shows the determinants of growth broken down by legal origin and 
prevalence of Islamic banks within French and British legal origin countries (there are no 
Islamic banking data points for Socialist, German, or Scandinavian legal origins). The 
savings rate is notably higher in French origin countries with Islamic banks than those 
without. In British legal origin countries, the population growth rate is statsitically 
significantly higher in countries with Islamic banks. In countries with either British or 
French origins, countries with Islamic banks have deeper financial systems and much 
higher GDP per capita than their counterparts. Table 9 similarly shows how countries 
with Scandanavian, German, or Soviet legal origin diverge in growth indicators, with a 
notably lower savings rate in Soviet countries.  
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The remainder of this paper formally analyzes the relationship between these 
variables, the deepening of the Islamic banking system, and economic growth. 
V. Empirical Framework and Results 
V.1 Determinants of Islamic Banking 
In order to test the determinants of Islamic banking, I estimate an equation of the 
following form: 
(1)                                          
where Muslim is the percent Muslim population, oilp is the oil price, and impemp 
represents the import-export ratio of goods to the Middle East. The y variable is one of 
two measures of Islamic banking diffusion: the ratio of the assets of Islamic banks to the 
assets of conventional banks and the number of Islamic banks. The subscript variables c 
and t represent country and time, respectively.  
In order to conduct regression analysis, the five year average of the growth period is 
used, a method established by Hauk and Wacziarg (2009) to mitigate noise when testing 
intertemporal variation.
8
 As shown by Tables 10 and 11, the percent of a country’s 
population that identifies as Muslim holds significant explanatory power for the presence 
of Islamic banks and the ratio of Islamic banking assets to conventional banking assets. 
This finding is in accord with previous research establishing percent Muslim as the 
greatest determinant of the presence of Islamic banks (Imam, Kpodar 2010). The oil price 
is a signficant determinant of the number of Islamic banks present, but not the diffusion 
                                                          
8
 Time periods used consist of: 1960-1964, 1965-1969, 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 
1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, and 2005-2006. 
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in terms of assets. This may be attributable to the possibility that the oil price also 
increases conventional banking assets, maintaining or even decreasing the categorical 
asset ratio. 
V.2. Determinants of GDP per Capita: The Role of Islamic Banks 
It has previously been determined that GDP is a significant explanatory variable of 
the diffusion of Islamic banking (Imam, Kpodar 2010). Consequently, equation (2) 
requires the application of a two stage least squares panel estimation (2SLS), the purpose 
of which is to create an exogenous variable, denoted as  ̂, which is correlated with the 
presence of Islamic banks but uncorrelated with GDP. As shown in Tables 10 and 11, the 
regressions of equation (1) determine Muslim to be a highly statistically significant 
explanatory variable of Islamic banking diffusion. If a country experiences a 10% growth 
in its Muslim population, the ratio of Islamic bank assets to conventional bank assets 
increases by 3.4 percentage points. These results render Muslim to be the most fitting 
exogenous variable in the 2SLS assessment. This regression technique uses instrumental 
variables to cut correlations between the error term and independent variables and 
requires a two stage regression process (Angrist, Imbens 1995).    
In order to mitigate the issue of endogenaiety, the instrument representative of the 
Islamic banking diffusion determined purely by Muslim population ( ̂), is included in 
some of the regressons exhibited in Table 12. Standard OLS regressions revealing the 
determinant power of Islamic banking diffusion are compared to 2SLS results of the 
determinant power of the exogenous instrument of Islamic banking diffusion.  
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I examine the determinant power of Islamic banks on GDP per capita by estimating 
an equation of the following forms using OLS:  
(2)                                                      
          
where intitialGDP is the log of initial income at the beginning of each period, n and s 
represent the log of population growth rate and the physical capital savings rate, 
respectively, legal represents the legal origin, and IB is defined as the two different 
measures of Islamic banking depending on the specification of the regression. The 
equation represents the classic Solow growth model, inclusive of the ratio of Islamic 
banking assets to conventional banking assets or the number of Islamic banks. I then 
compare the OLS results with the 2SLS results procured from the following estimation: 
(3a)                       
(3b)                                                     
                        ̂      
where  ̂ is the exogenous variable of Islamic banking determined by the percent Muslim 
of a population. All other variables are previously defined above.  
 Table 12 shows the results of the OLS and 2SLS regressions. The Solovian 
growth model (solely inclusive of population growth, savings rate, and initial GDP) 
confirms the significance of a percentage increase in the physical capital savings rate. 
Contrary to the predictions of the Solow model, percentage change in population growth 
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rate is insignificant in all regressions of this dataset. Both British and French legal origins 
are significant determinants of growth in this model, confirming past findings in the 
literature.  
The presence of Islamic banks is an insignificant determinant of GDP per capita 
growth whether measured by the asset ratio or the number of banks and whether raw or 
instrumented. However, the inclusion of its exogenous instrument does have an effect on 
the strength of beta-convergence. The basic Solovian specification in columns 1, 2, and 3 
of Table 12 show statistically significant convergence; countries with higher initial GDP 
per capita grow more slowly. After accounting for the intensity of Islamic banking by the 
instrument of percent Muslim population, this effect is halved and becomes much less 
statistically significant (column 4). This suggests that some of the effect of convergence 
may operate through the propensity to adopt Islamic banking.  
The data provides no evidence of an Islamic banking effect on the determinative 
power of legal origin. Contrary to the hypothesis that Islamic banks are immune to legal 
origins of their local institutions and would consequently decrease the effect on growth, 
the addition of Islamic banking assets does not impact the high significance of legal 
origin. Accordingly, the data seems to disaffirm this hypothesis.   
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V.3 Financial Depth: Islamic Banking Determinant Power 
 
I also test the effect of the presence of Islamic banks on the overall deepening of a 
country’s financial system, represented by the ratio of total banking assets to GDP, by 
estimating an equation of the following form: 
(4)            
  
     
 (
  
     
) (      )           
where  findepth is the financial depth ratio of total banking assets to GDP (
 
    
), 
  
     
is 
the asset ratio of Islamic banks to conventional banks, and legal is legal origin. All other 
variables are previously defined. 
Table 13 shows the effect of the Islamic banking asset ratio on financial deepening. 
The regression reveals a divergent relationship between the effect of Islamic banking 
assets on financial deepening in countries with British or French legal origin, impacted 
negatively and positively, respectively. The interacted variable results are significant and 
indicate that the effect of the growth of Islamic banking is dependent, in part, on the legal 
origins of the countries in which it takes root. The coefficient of the asset ratio reveals 
that the unique impact of that variable is negative when the country does not have legal 
French origin. 
 
 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
Islamic banking is continuing to grow as a viable financial institution in areas 
with Muslim populations across the world, yet its effect on economic growth and the 
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deepening of financial systems was previously undetermined. This paper attempted to 
add to the literature on Islamic banks by empirically investigating the determinants of the 
diffusion of Islamic banking, the effect of that diffusion on economic growth, and its 
impact on financial deepening. Furthermore, the effect of the diffusion of Islamic banking 
on the explanatory power of legal origin as a determinant of growth and financial 
deepening was tested.  
Confirming past research on the topic (see for example, Imam, Kpodar 2010), the 
most significant indicator of the diffusion of Islamic banks is the presence of a Muslim 
population. However, an increase in oil price also has a positive effect on the number of 
Islamic banks, but not on any relative increase in Islamic banking assets. This may be due 
to the impact of oil price on the growth of conventional banking assets, as well, rendering 
the ratio unchanged. This finding is supported by previous evidence that Islamic banking 
appears to be a complement to, rather than a substitute for, conventional banks (Imam, 
Kpodar 2010).  
The results show that the diffusion of Islamic banks has no significant explanatory 
power for GDP growth. However, these financial institutions do affect the determinative 
power of other common growth variables. Namely, controlling for the presence of 
Islamic banks renders initial GDP per capita less important, dampening convergence and 
suggesting that adoption of Islamic banking is somehow relevant to the process of 
convergence. Furthermore, there is no impact of the Islamic banking asset ratio on the 
determinant powers of legal origins. This result may be due, in part, to the variation in 
actual implementation of Shariah law in these institutions. While the literature has argued 
that Islamic banks may be impervious to the institutions in the societies in which they 
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develop since disputes are settled by Islamic jurisprudence, this hyothesis would only 
apply if Shariah law is strictly implemented (Imam et. al 2010). Variation in this practice 
may be the characteristic that renders the impact of Islamic banks on the determinant 
power of legal origin insignificant.  
This research unveils two topics for further exploration and analysis. First, 
Islamic banking may operate as a channel for the convergence process. Second, the 
degree to which Islamic banks render institutional environment, defined by legal origin, 
inconsequential is questionable in aggregate data. This finding implies the necessity for 
better measures of when Shariah laws are strictly enforced and actually constitute an 
alternate legal system.  
The results also show that the effect of Islamic banking on financial deepening is 
dependent on the legal origin of the countries in which it operates. Islamic banks are 
negatively correlated with financial system development in countries of British legal 
origin and positively correlated in countries with French legal origin. This outcome 
indicates that Islamic banks may be more beneficial to development of the financial 
sector in French legal origin countries. 
Muslim populations are underserved financially and predominantly come from 
less developed countries, rendering Islamic banking a potential tool for growth. Albeit a 
fairly new institution, Islamic banks are growing at a rapid rate and affecting the societies 
in which they take root. Consequently, their impact may become more apparent as the 
sector continues to grow. Further research, as more data becomes available, may reveal 
more conclusive results and provide answers to the financial communities that seek to 
abide by Islamic economics.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1 
 
Source: Hasan, Dridi, “The Effects of the Global Crisis on Islamic and Conventional Banks: A 
Comparative Study 
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Table 1: Islamic Banking Basic Terminology 
Riba (Interest) 
 
Defined as an unearned or unequally distributed 
income, forbidden in Islamic economic 
jurisprudence. 
Amana (Demand Deposits) 
Deposits held at the bank which are guaranteed in 
capital value but earn no return. 
Hibah (Gift) 
A token given voluntarily by a debtor to a debitor in 
return for a loan. Often used by banks when they 
voluntarily pay their customers a "gift" on savings 
account balances, representative of a portion of the 
profit made from those accounts. The gift cannot be 
guaranteed. 
Bay mu'ajal (Pre-delivery, deferred 
payment) 
The seller can sell a product on the basis of a 
deferred payment, in installments or a lump sum. 
The price of the product is agreed upon by buyer and 
seller and cannot include any charges for deferred 
payment.  
Mudaraba (Trustee finance contract) 
Rabb-ul-mal (capital's owner) provides the entire 
capital needed to finance a project while the 
entrepreneur offers his labor and expertise. Profits 
are shared between them at a certain fixed ratio, 
whereas financial losses are exclusively borne by 
rabb-ul-mal. The liability of the entrepreneur is 
limited only to his time and effort.  
Murabaha (Mark-up financing) 
The seller informs the buyer of his cost of acquiring 
or producing a specified product. The profit margin 
is negotiated between them and the total cost is 
usually paid in installments. 
Musharaka (Equity participation) 
The bank enters into an equity partnership 
agreement with one or more partners to jointly 
finance an investment project.  
Qard Hassana (Beneficence loans) 
Zero-return loans that the Qur'an encourages 
Muslims to make to the needy. Banks are allowed to 
charge borrowers a service fee to cover the 
administrative expenses of handling the loan. The 
fee cannot be related to the loan amount or maturity.  
Source: Cihak and Hesse, “Islamic Banks and Financial Stability: An Empirical Analysis,” IMF Working 
Paper 
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Table 2: Countries Without IB Data (n=188) 
Afghanistan   Czech Republic Latvia Romania 
Albania  Denmark Lesotho Russian Federation 
Algeria  Djibouti Liberia Rwanda 
American Samoa  Dominica Libya Samoa 
Andorra  
Dominican 
Republic Liechtenstein San Marino 
Angola  Ecuador Lithuania Sao Tome and Principe 
Anguilla  El Salvador Luxembourg Senegal 
Antigua and Barbuda  Equatorial Guinea Macao, China Serbia and Montenegro 
Argentina  Eritrea Macedonia, FYR Seychelles 
Armenia  Estonia Madagascar Sierra Leone 
Aruba  Ethiopia Malawi Singapore 
Australia  Faeroe Islands Maldives Slovak Republic 
Austria  Fiji Mali Slovenia 
Azerbaijan  Finland Malta Solomon Islands 
Bahamas, The  France Marshall Islands Somalia 
Barbados  French Polynesia Mauritius South Africa 
Belarus  Gabon Mayotte Spain 
Belgium  Georgia Mexico Sri Lanka 
Belize  Germany Micronesia, Fed. Sts. St. Kitts and Nevis 
Benin  Ghana Moldova St. Lucia 
Bermuda  Greece Monaco St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Bhutan  Greenland Mongolia Suriname 
Bolivia  Grenada Montserrat Swaziland 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  Guam Morocco Sweden 
Botswana  Guatemala Mozambique Switzerland 
Brazil  Guinea Myanmar Taiwan, China 
Bulgaria  Guinea-Bissau Namibia Tajikistan 
Burkina Faso  Guyana Nepal Tanzania 
Burundi  Haiti Netherlands Thailand 
Cambodia  Honduras Netherlands Antilles Timor-Leste 
Cameroon  Hong Kong, China New Caledonia Togo 
Canada  Hungary New Zealand Tonga 
Cape Verde  Iceland Nicaragua Trinidad and Tobago 
Central African Republic  India Niger Turkey 
Chad  Ireland Nigeria Turkmenistan 
Channel Islands  Isle of Man Northern Mariana Islands Uganda 
Chile  Israel Norway Ukraine 
China  Italy Oman United Kingdom 
Colombia  Jamaica Palau United States 
Comoros  Japan Panama Uruguay 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  Kazakhstan Papua New Guinea Uzbekistan 
Congo, Rep.  Kenya Paraguay Vanuatu 
Costa Rica  Kiribati Peru Venezuela, RB 
Croatia  Korea, Dem. Rep. Philippines Vietnam 
Ctte d'Ivoire  Korea, Rep. Poland Virgin Islands (U.S.) 
Cuba  Kyrgyz Republic Portugal Zambia 
Cyprus   Lao PDR Puerto Rico Zimbabwe 
37 
 
 
Table 3 
Category Variable Definition 
Rule of Law british English legal origin dummy 
  french French legal origin dummy 
  social Socialist legal origin dummy 
  german German legal origin dummy 
  scandi Scandinavian legal origin dummy 
  va Voice and Accountability 
  ps Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
  ge Government Effectiveness 
  rq Regulatory Quality 
  rl Rule of Law 
  co Control of Corruption 
Banking rint Real interest rate (%) 
  dint Deposit interest rate (%) 
  lint Lending interest rate (%) 
  asset_com Assets Commercial Banks 
 loan_com Loan Commercial Banks 
  asset_isl Assets Islamic Banks 
  loan_isl Loan Islamic Banks 
  isl Number of Islamic Banks 
  com Number of Commercial Banks 
  isl_b Number of Islamic Banks 
  idb Islamic Development Bank member countries 
  roa_com ROA Commercial Banks 
  roe_com ROE Commercial Banks 
  nbanks_com Number of Commercial Banks 
  nplratio_com Commercial Banks NPL Ratio 
  roa_isl ROA Islamic Banks 
  roe_isl ROE Islamic Banks 
  nbanks_isl Number of Islamic Banks 
  nplratio_isl Islamic Banks NPL Ratio 
Growth muslim Muslim Population Share 
  oilp Average Oil Price 
  gdp_curr GDP (current US$) 
  Inc_10 Income share held by lowest 10% 
  Inc_20 Income share held by lowest 20% 
 sec1 School enrollment, primary (% gross) 
  sec2 School enrollment, primary (% net) 
  exp Share of imports from Middle East 
  imp Share of exports to Middle East 
  pop_growth Population growth rate 
  ci Investment share of PPP converted GDP per capita 
  rgdpch PPP converted GDP per capita 
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Table 4: Legal Origin Observations 
 
Legal Origin Obs Percentage  
French 3807 44  
British 3008 35  
Socialist 1363 16  
German 235 3  
Scandinavian 235 3  
Total 8648   
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Table 5: WGI Descriptions  
World Governance Indicator Description 
Voice and Accountability 
 
 
 
 
Capturing perceptions of the extent to which a 
country's citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free 
media. 
Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence 
 
 
Capturing perceptions of the likelihood that a 
government will be destabilized or overthrown 
by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
politically-motivated violence and terrorism. 
Government Effectiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
Capturing perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. 
Regulatory Quality 
 
 
 
Capturing perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development. 
Rule of Law 
 
 
 
 
 
Capturing perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence. 
Control of Corruption 
 
 
 
 
Capturing perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by 
elites and private interests. 
  
`  
Source: Kaufmann, Daniel. (2010) “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues”  
Brookings Institute, The World Bank.      
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Table 6: WGI by Presence of Islamic Banks 
 >0 Islamic Banks 0 Islamic Banks   0 Islamic Banks (all inclusive)  
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Ttest9 Mean Std. Dev. Ttest 
WGI         
Voice and Accountability -0.83 0.45 -0.83     1.00 0.07 0.04 1.01 10.31*** 
Political Stability -0.43 0.98 -0.72     1.20 -1.50   -0.03 0.99 4.64*** 
Government Effectiveness -0.08 0.68 -0.50     1.07 -2.94*** 0.00 1.04  0.83 
Regulatory Quality -0.11 0.79 -0.66     1.14 -3.35*** -0.01 1.03  1.14   
Rule of Law -0.10 0.74 -0.31     0.88 -1.50  -0.05 1.02  0.54 
Control of Corruption -0.08 0.71 -0.43     0.76 -2.49** -0.01 1.04  0.84 
Observations 146^  37^   1390^   
         
^some vary due to missing data  
**significant at 5% ***significant at 1%        
 
                                                          
9
 The T-tests test the mean difference between those countries without and with Islamic banks. 
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Table 7: Growth Indicators by Presence of Islamic Banks 
 >0 Islamic Banks 0 Islamic Banks   0 Islamic Banks (all inclusive) 
 Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Ttest10 Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Ttest 
Standard Controls         
Physical Capital Savings 
Rate (%) 27.45 11.19 20.39 11.30 -4.75*** 23.32 11.65 -5.41*** 
Population Growth Rate 
(%) 2.72 2.01 2.99 1.04 1.26 1.90 0.02 -8.06*** 
Real Interest Rate (%) 6.67 9.07 7.02 11.18 0.21 6.01 19.97 -0.40 
Deposit Interest Rate (%) 7.38 4.13 9.95 7.20 3.17*** 52.07 1729.26 0.33 
Lending Interest Rate 
(%) 13.22 6.22 16.99 8.38 3.41*** 54.19 1989.13 0.26 
Muslim Population Share 
(%) 86.00 0.90 89.72 0.90 2.33** 27.19 36.97 -24.74*** 
Dependent Variables         
IB Assets/CB Assets 0.57 4.03 0.00 0.00 -1.14 0.00 0.00 -5.74*** 
Financial Depth (Total 
Bank Assets/GDP) (%)  0.14 0.00 0.11 0.00 -1.07 0.06 0.00 -11.51*** 
GDP per Capita 17698.84 20889.34 3776.50 6683.17 -5.68*** 7988.33 9995.84 -14.05*** 
Observations 240^  80^   9389^   
         
^some vary due to missing data  
**significant at 5% ***significant at 1%        
                                                          
10
 The T-tests test the mean difference between those countries without and with Islamic banks. 
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Table 8: Growth Indicators by Legal Origin and Presence of Islamic Banks 
  
 
French without IBs French with IBs   British without IBs British with IBs   
Standard Controls Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  
Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  
Ttest Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  
Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  
Ttest 
Physical Capital 
Savings Rate (%) 
22.65 11.42 29.43 10.65 -6.33*** 23.74 22.8 25.34 11.88 -1.40 
Population Growth 
Rate (%) 
2.18 1.42 2.41 2.17 -1.63 2.10 1.91 2.93 1.91 -5.03*** 
Real Interest Rate 
(%) 
6.75 15.22 6.95 8.40 -0.11 5.26 23.58 6.78 9.83 -0.50 
Deposit Interest 
Rate (%) 
41.51 512.47 8.30 3.37 0.58 87.49 2879.17 5.45 3.32 0.24 
Lending Interest 
Rate (%) 
24.66 130.11 13.78 5.76 0.75 101.26 3210.02 11.55 6.23 0.21 
Muslim Population 
Share (%) 
34.36 40.88 92.26 8.57 -15.30*** 23.98 33.43 78.23 15.18 -17.07*** 
Dependent 
Variables       
 
  
IB Assets/CB 
Assets 
0.00 0.00 0.80 5.82 -3.82*** 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.84 -10.12*** 
Financial Depth 
(Total Bank 
Assets/GDP) 
0.05 0.06 0.16 0.16 -14.21*** 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.19 -5.30*** 
GDP per Capita 6159.16 7933.9 16050 20475.1 -12.16*** 8719.26 11557.68 20954 21534.9 -10.38*** 
Observations 3360^ 
 
117^ 
 
 
2351^ 
 
112^ 
 
  
^some vary due to missing data  
  
 
    
 
**significant at 5% ***significant at 1% 
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Table 9: Growth Indicators by Legal Origin 
    
 
  
Socialist All^ German All^ Scandinavian All^ 
 
  
Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  
 Standard Controls 
      
 Physical Capital 
Savings Rate (%) 
19.82 11.91 29.04 5.79 25.38 6.06 
 Population Growth 
Rate (%) 
1.26 1.38 0.71 0.68 0.59 0.42 
 Real Interest Rate (%) 5.09 21.52 3.92 3.02 5.09 4.88 
 Deposit Interest Rate 
(%) 
20.88 48.58 5.33 4.57 8.53 7.66 
 Lending Interest Rate 
(%) 
31.03 52.33 7.45 3.21 12.95 7.77 
 Muslim Population 
Share (%) 
22.75 34.58 2.29 1.99 1.78 1.54 
 Dependent Variables 
      
 IB Assets/CB Assets 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Financial Depth (Total 
Bank Assets/GDP) (%)  
0.04 0.12 0.14 0.05 0.00 0.00 
 GDP per Capita 4388.53 3858.38 20914.9 10439.29 25128.2 8797.34 
 Observations 
       
 ^Socialist, German, and Scandinavian legal origin countries have no Islamic banking data points 
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Table 10: OLS Coefficients 
IB/CB asset ratio 
  
 
Table 11: OLS Coefficients 
Number of Islamic banks 
 
     
Muslim (%) 
 
.0034*** 
(.0012)  
Muslim (%) 
 
.0049*** 
(.0005) 
Oil Price 
 
-.0020               
(.0027)  
Oil Price 
 
.0074***              
(.0026) 
Imports/Exports to Middle East 
 
0              
(.0001)  
Imports/Exports to Middle East 
 
0              
(0) 
Constant 
 
.0501 
(.1051)  
Constant 
 
-.1791*** 
(.0877) 
R-Squared 
 
.0224 
  
R-Squared 
 
.0884 
 
     
Observations 414  Observations 1268 
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
        
*significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%   
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Table 12: OLS and 2SLS Coefficients 
GDP per Capita Growth 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Determinant 
      
Population Growth 
Rate (log) 
-.0023            
(.0015) 
.0007 
(.0016) 
.0067 
(.0016) 
.0007   
(.0015) 
.0024 
(.0079) 
.0242   
(.0423) 
Physical Capital 
Savings Rate (log) 
.0209***      
(.0025) 
.0216*** 
(.0025) 
.0216*** 
(.0025) 
.0179*** 
(.0023) 
.0076 
(.0083) 
.0222 
(.0450) 
Initial GDP per Capita 
(log) 
-.0045*** 
(.0014) 
-.0044*** 
(.0014) 
-.0044*** 
(.0014) 
-.0024*   
(.0013)  
-.0034 
(.0036) 
.0224  
(.0642)  
British Legal Origin 
 
 
-.0137*** 
(.0055) 
-.0137*** 
(.0055) 
-.0123***   
(.0046) 
-.0159* 
(.0088) 
 .0276 
(.1014) 
French Legal Origin 
  
-.0164*** 
(.0053) 
-.0164*** 
(.0054) 
-.0170*** 
(.0043) 
.0120* 
(.0031) 
.0134 
(.0041) 
IB/CB Asset Ratio 
 
  
-.0008 
(.0021) 
    
Exogenous Instrument: 
IB/CB Asset Ratio 
   
-.0108 
(.0280) 
   
Number of Islamic 
Banks 
    
.0019 
(.0021) 
  
Exogenous Instrument: 
Number of Islamic 
Banks 
 
     
-.0497 
(.1085)  
 
Constant 
 
-.0029 
(.0122) 
.0068 
(.0127) 
.0068 
(.0127) 
.0003  
(.0120) 
.0344 
(.0300) 
 -.1726 
(.5351) 
R-Squared .0386 .0558 .0559 .0594 .0826 .0054 
Observations 1493 1440 1440 1276 80 80 
       *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1% 
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Table 13: OLS Coefficients 
Financial Deepening                                                          
(dependent variable: Total Assets/GDP) 
   
 
1 
 
2 
 
IB/CB Asset Ratio 
 
0                     
(0) 
-.0001*       
(0.0001) 
 
(IB/CB Asset 
Ratio)(British) 
-.0001**     
(.0001)  
British 
 
.0002***    
(0)  
(IB/CB Asset 
Ratio)(French)  
.0001*  
(.0001) 
 French 
  
-.0001***   
(0) 
Constant 
 
.0006***  
(0) 
.0007***   
(0) 
R-Squared .0123 .0068 
Observations 2032 2032 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1% 
 
